

R U S S I A N O R G A N I Z E D C R I M E

Global Organized Crime Project

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Summary of Recommendations

The Russian Organized Crime Task Force recommends that the following actions be taken:

- ☐ ROC should receive public recognition from the president of the United States as a national security threat.
- ☐ The development of a free market in Russia founded on the rule of law should be recognized as the only long-term policy solution for ROC and must be central to all U.S. policy decisions.
- ☐ In order to mitigate instances of corruption within the Russian government, U.S. policies and actions should shift from support for political personalities to support for segments of the Russian government that are working to usher in the rule of law. Strengthening the rule of law will foster the emergence of a viable market economy in Russia, free from the coercion and extortion activities of ROC groups.
- ☐ Russia must work toward the creation of a strong and impartial judiciary to implement and enforce a fair body of civil, criminal, and contract law to regain control over the adjudication role currently played by ROC groups.
- ☐ U.S. support for reform should reinforce training and exchanges such as those currently in place, funded through the National Endowment for Democracy, the Department of Justice, and the Agency for International Development. These programs, as well as similar efforts within the private sector and the academic community, should be continued and expanded through appropriate funding by Congress.
- ☐ A similar effort should be undertaken in the private sector to support legitimate regulation of Russian industry, business, and trade. Specifically, the Russian government should be assisted in establishing uniform business operation regulations, professional standards for certain industries, and requirements for the issuance and regular renewal of business licenses and other permits.
- ☐ Stringent requirements to ensure transparency in Russia's use of foreign aid, as well as multilateral loans and export financing, should be implemented and enforced to insulate the funds from OC and to ensure that the

funds reach their intended destinations.

- ☐ The United States should initiate a discussion at the level of the Summit of the Eight of an investment treaty to deny export credits to Western firms doing business with OC-controlled firms in Russia.
- ☐ Because ROC activity requires a response from multiple U.S. government agencies with multiple roles and missions, decisions over whether prosecution or foreign policy objectives should take precedence should be made on a case-by-case basis.
- ☐ Because businesspersons often become the targets of ROC activity, a greater effort should be made to provide them with relevant information. The Foreign Commercial Service of Department of Commerce in conjunction with the Overseas Security Advisory Council of the Department of State should work with other U.S. agencies and the Russian government to advise and support businesspersons, providing them especially with alternatives to paying extortion to criminal elements in Russia.
- ☐ A shared public database on ROC, including a collation of declassified and open-source materials, also should be created to assist investors from the United States and other countries. The database could be supplemented by a classified database for use by U.S. government agencies only. Considering the transnational breadth of ROC activity, a database supporting intelligence-sharing among various groups like the P-8, Europol, and the “six nation group”⁴ addressing the transnational aspects of the ROC threat is also necessary.
- ☐ The U.S. intelligence community must be directed to fill the immense intelligence gaps on ROC. Their elements should use well-tested operational know-how and tradecraft to recruit informants inside ROC or induce defections from the various ranks of people who can provide hard, inside knowledge of how the various ROC elements operate, do not operate, cooperate, and do not cooperate.
- ☐ The interpenetration of Russian officialdom, businesses, and criminal organizations make it more imperative than ever that U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies fully cooperate and share the fruits of their respective disciplines to serve U.S. policy, security, and commercial interests more capably.
- ☐ Close U.S. government identification with corrupt elements of Russia’s political establishment risks serious popular backlash inside Russia. The United States must avoid the appearance of unqualified support for what is routinely seen as a kleptocratic establishment. Such linkage reinforces a

4. The “six nation group” includes the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and Russia.

growing popular perception that democratic political and market economic systems are merely code words for rapacious criminality. The United States should address this perception by increasing its public diplomacy discussion of the causes of and cures for ROC.

- The U.S. government must support not only senior-level reformers in the Russian government, but reformers outside government as well. The United States should not remain silent in the face of official hostility to respected human rights leaders like Sergey Kovalev of the Sakharov Foundation or fabricated charges against the environmentalist Captain Nikitin.